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INTRODUCTION 
Definiticn of Terms 
Throughout this manuscript several complex theoretical 
constructs will be used. At this point definitions of these 
constructs will be given along with two examples of how the 
term is to be used. The first example comes from everyday 
events, while the second comes from operational definitions 
of these constructs employed in this investigation. Further 
clarification of these constructs will be given throughout 
the manuscript. 
Character; The traits an observer assigns to another person. 
As in: The student is diligent. The experimental 
accomplice is good. 
Deserving: Refers to the relation of a person's character to 
his/her outcomes. As in: A student who is diligent in 
completing his/her assignments deserves a grade of "A." The 
experimental accomplice deserves to be shocked because he/she 
is a bad person. 
Justice: Refers to the expected relation of a person to 
his/her outcomes. As in: One expects a diligent student to 
get an "A." one expects bad things, such as being shocked, 
to happen to a bad person. 
Injustice: Refers to the case of deserving where the 
expected relation of a person to his/her outcomes is 
disturbed. As in: The computer unjustly assigned a diligent 
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student an "F" when he/she should have received an "A." The 
experimental accomplice should not have been shocked because 
he/she is a good person. 
Suffering: A special case of injustice where a person 
receives undeserved aversive outcomes. As in: The boy was 
struck by lightning. The experimental accomplice was 
shocked. 
Derogation: The process where by an observer comes to 
consider a victim as "bad" or "unlikable." As in: A girl 
who is raped is considered a "slut." ii;\ experimental 
accomplice who is shocked is considered to be a "bad" person. 
Attribution: A process similar to derogation whereby an 
observer assigns traits to another person in creating a 
psychological reality. As in: The priest is considered 
"pure." The experimental accomplice is considered "good" as 
well as "likable." 
Social Comparison: The process where by one person compares 
his/her outcomes to the outcomes of appropriate others. As 
in: A grade of "A" is only valuable in so far as the other 
students in the class do not all receive an "A," The 
experimental accomplice being shocked is important in so far 
as everyone in the experiment is not shocked. 
Ingratiation: The process where by one increases the number 
of positive traits attributed to oneself fay others. As in: 
The salesman ingratiated himself by buying the client's 
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dinner. The experimental accomplice ingratiated 
himself/herself by agreeing to be shocked in place of the 
subject in hopes of making a good impression on the subject. 
Social Context: A set of persons (victim, observer, 
perpetrator) and their relationships (interdependence, 
perceived similarity, beneficence). As in: Enemies provide 
a different social context than do friends. The experimental 
accomplice (victim) was perceived by the subject (observer) 
as similar in personality (relationship) and was shocked by 
the experimenter (perpetrator). 
Beneficence: A special case of observer-victim relationships 
where the victim's suffering benefits the observer. As in: 
A soldier's death in battle benefits his country if the war 
is won. The shocking of the experimental accomplice allowed 
the subject to avoid being shocked. 
Interdependence: A general set of relationships among tyo or 
more people where the behavior or fate of one is especially 
important to the other (others). As in: The probability of 
England surviving the two World wars depended on the United 
States entering the wars. The probability of the subject 
avoiding the shock depended on the experimental accomplice 
being shocked. 
Outcome: An event which is defined by the rewards minus the 
costs. As in; The Indians won the battle, but lost the war 
when they killed Custer. The experimental accomplice was 
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paid two dollars, but was also shocked. 
Hedonic Relevance: A special case of interdependence where 
the actor's behavioral choice has desirable or undesirable 
effects for the observer. As in: The son's death in Viet 
Nam following volunteering to serve in the army brings grief 
to his parents. Observing the experimental accomplice being 
shocked after he/she volunteered to learn a list of paired 
associates affects the emotional state of the subject. 
Personalism: A special case of interdependence where the 
actor is aware that his/her actions will have desirable or 
undesirable effects for the observer. As in: A professor 
knows that praising a student to another professor makes the 
student feel good. The experimental accomplice is aware that 
volunteering to be shocked will allow the subject to avoid 
the shock. 
The Just World: Where Fates Are Deserved 
Why do we eulogize Joan of Arc, yet react 
dispassionately to a victim of social injustice? How can we 
rationalize the suffering of the poor, while justifying the 
making of excess profits? These and other questions 
centering around the psychology of justice and deserving have 
recently been investigated by Belvin Lerner and his 
associates. Typically, the focus has been on observer's 
reactions to suffering in others. The research question 
usually under investigation is, "How are an observer's 
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perceptions of another's attractiveness affected by watching 
the other person suffer?" 
According to Lerner (1974), people have a need to 
believe that the world is just, a predictable place where 
everyone gets what he/she deserves. The principle of 
"fairness" which entitles everyone to equal treatment is the 
primary rule of the game of life. This normative belief in 
justice for all is learned early in childhood. Our religion, 
capitalistic economic system, and cultural institutions such 
as the courts constantly reinforce the theme that everyone 
should and will get what he/she deserves in life. Those who 
cheat or profit by illicit means will be punished sooner or 
later and those who are unjustly deprived will be compensated 
in the long run. 
Justice and Deserving 
The meaning of justice is based on the concept of 
deserving, with deserving defined as the outcome a person is 
entitled to. Here, deserving comes from two properties of 
the individual, explanation of the discrepancy between what 
the other person deserved and what he/she received. It is 
apparent that restoring justice may result in an increase or 
decrease in the perceived attractiveness of a recipient of 
positive or negative outcomes (e.g., the recipient's goodness 
and likability). Thus if there is no apparent link between 
outcomes and the recipient's behavior, and the inflictor is 
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not condemned or praised, we assume that good things happen 
to good people and that bad things happen to bad people in 
order to maintain a consistent view on life. 
Support for the Just World 
The history of the just world hypothesis began with 
Lerner (1965) conducting a study to determine if people view 
the world as a predictable place where everyone gets what 
he/she deserves. The observers in that study overheard two 
actors working at an anagrams task for a possible payment of 
$3.50. Since funds were limited, only one of the actors 
would be paid at the end of the experiment. The observers 
overheard a random draw decide which actor was to receive the 
$3.50. The results indicated that even though the observers 
knew payment was determined purely by chance, they still 
preferred to believe that the fortuitously rewarded actor had 
actually performed better than the nonrewarded actor- Rather 
than praise the experimenter for his generosity, the 
observers restored justice by erroneously perceiving an actor 
who received positive outcomes as a person ?Tho caused his/her 
own good fortune. Since the fortuitous reward was attributed 
to the recipient's behavior in that study, an increase in the 
recipient's perceived attractiveness relative to the 
nonrewarded actor did not occur. 
Lerner and Simmons (1966) extended these findings to 
include reactions to negative outcomes. This study provided 
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the basic paradigm employed by Lerner to study observers' 
reactions to a victim. It involves the use of an 
experimental accomplice as a recipient of suffering inflicted 
by the experimenter who serves as the third party in creating 
an injustice by manipulating deserving. Victimization is 
operationalized by having the confederate apparently receive 
shocks for making mistakes while learning a list of 
paired-associates. Actually, all observers view a standard 
videotape in which the confederate-victim reacts with pain 
and anguish to the apparently painful shocks. The observers 
are then asked to give their impressions of the victim (i.e., 
rate the confederate's goodness and likability). The results 
indicated that observation of another suffering leads to a 
lowering of the victim's perceived attractiveness relative to 
the perceived attractiveness of the average person. 
Presumably the observers could net attribute the victiz's 
suffering to the victim's behavior and subseguently restored 
justice by deciding that the victim was a bad person who 
deserved the punishment. Hence, the victim was not someone 
they should like. 
Iri the Lerner and Simmons' (1965) study, perceptions of 
another person were distorted by the observers to compensate 
for an apparent lack of fit between the other's behavior and 
outcomes. Since the victim's behavior did not clearly 
justify the undeserved suffering, and the observers could not 
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fault the scientific investigation underway, distortions of 
the victim's perceived attractiveness were used as 
justification. This unexpected derogation of an apparently 
innocent victim was explained by Lerner (1974) as due to the 
injustice of the victim's suffering posing a threat to the 
individual's belief that the world is just. The observers 
removed this threat by distorting the victim's perceived 
attractiveness which made the victim appear deserving of the 
suffering in the observers' eyes. Unfortunately little is 
known about the conditions under which a characterological 
justification will be employed. That is, the quality or 
amount of work as well as the individual's social status may 
be used in deciding whether or not an individual deserves the 
outcomes he/she has received. Hence, deserving refers 
primarily to the relation between a person and his/her 
outcomes: 
Justice, as defined here, involves a third party in 
calculating deserving. The introduction of a third party in 
defining justice is Lerner*s unique contribution to 
understanding injustice, and allows easy manipulation of 
justice through manipulation of deserving, when someone's 
outcomes are more or less desirable than expected, and these 
outcomes are caused by fate, another person, or an agency of 
society, then a injustice has occurred. Clearly, an 
injustice is not deserved since the relation between a person 
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and his/her outcomes is disturbed by this third party. Even 
though a person's inputs may be used to "justify" his/her 
outcomes, this concept of justice does not refer to Walster's 
concept of equity (Walster, Eerscheid, S Walster, 1972) or to 
Homan's concept of distributive justice (Homans, 1961) since 
it does not refer to the distribution of jointly earned 
rewards or imply a comparison of the ratio of inputs and 
outcomes from one person to another. 
Thus a threat to our belief in justice for all occurs 
when misfortune or good fortune is not clearly deserved. 
People may react negatively to this violation of the rule of 
fairness by lowering their opinion of the inflictor of the 
injustice. After all, the inflictor has violated a basic 
rule of social intercourse. Unfortunately, if the observer 
can do nothing to alleviate the victim's suffering, the 
majority of observers sill ccndesn the victim; especially if 
the inflictor is fate or a powerful other. If the observer 
can not condemn the inflictor, he/she searches for a causal 
link between the recipient's behavior and the unexplained 
outcome. Failing that, the observer relies on a 
characterological Thus there is a need to understand why 
people label a victim of rape as "bad" and "unlikable." The 
question becomes: "Why do observer's tend to derogate a 
victim, rather than blame the perpetrator of the injustice?". 
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statement of Purpose 
The present research is concerned with understanding 
observers* reactions to suffering, and seeks to determine the 
conditions which foster a characterological justification for 
undeserved suffering when the observer can not blame the 
perpetrator of the undeserved suffering. Primarily, the 
present research is concerned with the impact of the 
observers' relationship to the victim on the observers' 
perceptions of the victim. It is highly unlikely that a 
truely detached observer exists. The question of how an 
observer's relationship to a victim influences the observer's 
reactions to the victim's suffering needs to be investigated 
as a possible antecedent of victim derogation. The victim's 
pre-suffering behavior will also be varied to determine if 
the victim's intentions influence his/her perceived 
attractiveness. The intentions attributed to the victim are 
important and will be investigated to determine if 
attribution theory principles can aid us in understanding 
reactions to suffering. Attribution theory was chosen 
because it can be defined as a theory of how people assign 
meaning to other people and events associated with those 
other people. Individual differences in the tendency to 
believe in justice for all will also be examined to see if 
perceptions of victims vary with strength of a belief in 
justice for all. 
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The approach taken here will be one of empiricism in an 
attempt to delineate the conditions which lead observers to 
distort a victim's character. This approach is necessary 
since the cognitive processes involved are difficult to 
observe and the theories under investigation are difficult to 
verify. Fortunately, both attribution theory and Lerner's 
just world hypothesis make some suggestions as to what 
variables might influence reactions to suffering. 
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STUDY I 
The first experiment is concerned with the following 
questions: When a person suffers and thereby spares another 
person from having to undergo discomfort, is the victim of 
suffering liked more when the degree of suffering is mild or 
intense? Is this beneficent victim liked more when the 
compensation for suffering is great or small? Since previous 
research on reactions to suffering has failed to take into 
account the implications of the victim's suffering for the 
observer, the data to be gathered were viewed as an extension 
of previous knowledge. However, attribution theory (Heider, 
1958; Jones 6 Davis, 1965) and the just world hypothesis of 
Lerner (1974) suggest alternative interpretations of what 
reactions to suffering will occur in this situation where the 
relationship of victim to observer is benefactor to 
beneficiary. 
Attribution theory suggests that if the victim's 
suffering benefits the observer, the observer should view the 
beneficent victim as attractive. According to Heider (1958, 
p. 199) and Jones and Davis (1965, p. 237), an important 
determinant of attraction is whether or not another person's 
outcomes have significant rewarding or punishing implications 
for the observer. In attribution theory language, another 
person's outcomes influence our liking for him/her if they 
are hedonically relevant. However, the relationship between 
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benefit and liking is not that simple. The motive attributed 
to a beneficent victim is also a determinant of an observer's 
liking for him/her (Heider, 1958, p. 257; Jones 8 Davis 1965, 
p. 259). Thus, the modified prediction is as follows: When 
a person intentionally suffers for us, the greater the 
benefit and the less the explicit compensation for the 
beneficial behavior, the greater our liking should be for 
that person. Compensation would reduce our liking for that 
person because he/she did not intentionally benefit us but 
did so incidentally to acquiring the reward. Thus, a person 
who chooses to suffer greatly for little reward, and thereby 
spares another from great hardship should be viewed as highly 
attractive. 
Attribution theory offers no clear predictions of the 
perceived attractiveness of a beneficent victim when he/she 
suffers because cf chance considerations. Even though the 
beneficent victim's suffering may prove gratifying or 
disappointing to the observer (i.e., be hedonically 
relevant), the victim's intention to benefit the observer 
would not be present. In ether words, personalis® (Jones & 
Davis, 1965), or the inference concerning the victim's 
intentions, would not be present under conditions of fate and 
the observer would be unsure of his/her feelings toward the 
victim. When fate operates, behavior does not involve 
personal causation and therefore no inferences about the 
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beneficent victim's motives can be made, regardless of 
compensation and intensity ot suffering. 
The just world hypothesis suggests completely opposite 
predictions. In a just world, a predictable place where 
everyone gets what is coming to him/her, suffering must be 
explained. Lerner (1974) suggests that an observer often 
justifies another's suffering by perceiving him/her to be an 
undesirable individual who deserved the suffering. From this 
point of view, the hedonic relevance of the victim's 
suffering for the observer is irrelevant, as are the victim's 
intentions. 
One general implication of this position is that the 
perceived attractiveness of a beneficent victim should be a 
negative function of the intensity of the suffering. In a 
just world, a beneficent victim suffering slightly should be 
perceived as more attractive than a victin suffering 
intensely, since greater suffering would happen only to a 
less desirable individual whc deserved the suffering more. 
This perception would preserve a belief in justice for all. 
Another general implication of the just world hypothesis 
is that when suffering leads to compensation, the victim 
should be perceived as more attractive than if the victim 
goes uncompensated. This should occur because compensation 
for suffering justifies the event (e.g., he/she suffered for 
the reward). Thus, there is no reason to perceive a rewarded 
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victim as an undesirable, bad person. 
A third implication of Lerner's hypothesis is that the 
perceived attractiveness of a voluntary victim is a function 
of the instrumental value of the outcomes. This occurs 
because personal characteristics of the actor are not used by 
observers as justification for outcomes under conditions of 
intentionality (Apsler S Friedman, 1975) . Since there is a 
behavioral explanation, a belief in justice for all would not 
be threatened and distorted perceptions of the victim's 
character are not necessary to restore justice. The 
instrumental value of the outcomes determines the victim's 
perceived attractiveness because, as Heider (1958, p. 235) 
points out, the relationship between goodness and good 
fortune and wickedness and misfortune is so strong that given 
one of these conditions, the other is frequently assumed. 
with regard to chance considerations, clear predictions 
are once again difficult. One would expect a victim of fate 
to produce the greatest threat to a belief in justice for 
all. However, past research has been confusing concerning 
this situation. For example, observers tend to assign locus 
of causality to a victim even when there is no apparent link 
between the victim's behavior and his/her misfortune (Lerner 
& Matthews, 1967). Thus, the cognitive nature of the just 
world hypothesis makes it difficult to predict reactions to 
suffering under the ambiguous conditions of fate, and 
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reactions to a beneficent victim of fate will depend upon the 
intensity of suffering, compensation, and attribution of 
responsibility to the victim. 
Study I was conducted to determine which of these two 
positions, attribution theory, or the just world hypothesis 
provides a better understanding of the perceived 
attractiveness of a beneficent victim when the observer is 
cast in the role of nonsuffering coactor. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
The subjects were 64 female volunteers who participated 
to receive extra credit in an introductory course. Eight 
treatment combinations were formed by crossing the following 
factors: 1) the intensity of the victim's suffering, 
operationalized by the number of unpleasant tasks required of 
the beneficent victim (5 or 10) ; 2) the amount of 
compensation for suffering ($0 or $2); and 3) the victim's 
intentionality regarding the suffering (fate or voluntarily) . 
Procedure 
The experiment was advertised as an investigation of the 
perceived tasteability of several foods. When the subject 
arrived for the experiment, she was greeted by the 
experimenter and introduced to the female confederate who was 
described to the subject as another introductory psychology 
student. The experiment was then described as involving the 
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rating of several "good" and "bad" tasting foods along the 
dimension of "tasteabilityThe participants were then told 
that two sets of cups on a table contained samples of the 
kinds of foods they could expect to be tasting. Crushed 
Cheerios composed the "good" sample and raw yeast the "bad." 
The subject and confederate then tasted the Cheerios and raw 
yeast samples with the confederate picking up empty cups 
unavailable to the subject. After this sample tasting, the 
experimental manipulations were conducted. 
Initially, the pair was told that one of them had to 
taste the "bad" foods because if given a choice, everyone 
would taste only the good foods. In the high compensation 
condition, a $2.00 compensation was offered to the taster of 
the "bad" foods, while in the low compensation conditions no 
mention of compensation was made. In the voluntary 
r*r>r> ^ k a o v 4 man 4- ar" ac Ir f a •Vac+'O 
the "bad" foods, in which case the confederate always 
volunteered. In the fate conditions, a coin was flipped with 
the confederate always "losing," Intensity of suffering was 
manipulated by requiring the confederate to taste five (low 
intensity) or ten (high intensity) "bad" foods. Following 
these manipulations, the compensation was paid if offered, 
and the tasting began. 
During the tasting, the subject and confederate were 
separated by a partition so that the subject could not see 
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the confederate. The confederate did no actual tasting, but 
noticeably grumbled about how awful the "bad" foods tasted. 
Three grumbles were emitted for the low intensity of 
suffering conditions, while six grumbles occurred in the high 
intensity of suffering conditions. The subject actually 
tasted and rated the tasteability of crushed Cheerios, 
crackers, peanuts, granola, and Sugar Pops on a 1 (bad) to 5 
(good) scale. The good foods were rated as "good" by the 
subjects, as expected (overall average = 3.2). 
After the tasteability ratings were completed, the pair 
was asked to fill out a questionnaire concerning their 
impressions of one another. Before they could begin, 
however, the confederate asked to be excused since she was 
not feeling well, and subsequently exited. This ruse was 
added to strengthen the intensity of suffering manipulation 
and to allow the confederate time to get prepared for the 
next subject. The subject then rated the confederate on a 
1-99 point scale for the following five characteristics: 
goodness, reputability, likability, beauty, and bravery 
(Appendix A). The scale was anchored at the extremes with 
agree and disagree, and at the neutral point with uncertain. 
The average of the goodness and likability ratings composed 
the attraction measure since these characteristics seem to 
comprise what Heider (1958) terms as sentiment. The ratings 
were made in response to the statement: "Compared to the 
average student, the other subject is...." 
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Results and Discussion 
Prior to analysis, all responses were transformed to 
normalized ranks (Wolins 6 Dickinson, 1973). This 
transformation serves several purposes. It gives greater 
weight to response differences at either end of the original 
scale. Thus, the normal deviate transformation with a large 
number of scale categories as found in the present 
investigation results in greater reliability and makes the 
mean and variance independent across items (Liu, Note 1). 
For purposes of summarizing the data in tables, the mean 
transformed scores were converted back into the original 
scale values to aid the reader in determining where the group 
differences were located on the scale used by the subjects. 
By way of summary, the following hypotheses were tested 
in this study: From attribution theory; 1) a victim whose 
suffering benefits an observer should be liked, 2) greater 
suffering should lead to greater attraction to a beneficent 
victim, 3) compensation for suffering should attenuate these 
general effects of beneficial suffering, and 4) a voluntary 
beneficent victim should be liked more that a victim of fate. 
From the just world hypothesis, these competing hypotheses 
were derived: 1) the beneficial nature of the suffering is 
irrelevant to the perceived attractiveness of the victim, 2) 
greater suffering should lead to less attraction, 3) 
compensation for suffering should attenuate these general 
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effects of suffering, and 4) attraction to a voluntary victim 
should be a function of the instrumental value of the 
victim's outcomes. 
A 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance conducted on the 
attraction ratings yielded a significant main effect for 
intensity of suffering (with greater attraction to the mildly 
suffering victim) and a significant interaction of the 
victim's intentionality with compensation (Appendix B), The 
average attraction ratings for the beneficent victim made by 
each group appear in Table 1. simple effects tests conducted 
after collapsing over intensity of suffering suggested a 
compensated voluntary victim was perceived as more attractive 
than an uncompensated voluntary victim (t(55) = 1.70, £ < 
.10). Comparison of the uncompensated victim of fate with 
the compensated victim of fate revealed that the 
uncompensated victim of fate was perceived as more attractive 
(t(56) = 2.45 £ < .05). Finally, the uncompensated victim of 
fate was perceived as more attractive than a voluntary victim 
who was uncompensated (t(56) = 2.83, £ < .01). 
These results support hypotheses 1 and 4 derived from 
the just world hypothesis and support none of the hypotheses 
derived from attribution theory. Thus, support for the just 
world rather than attribution theory was obtained in Study I 
in that a mildly suffering beneficent victim was liked more 
than an intensely suffering one, and a compensated victim who 
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Table 1. Mean perceived attractiveness scores for the victim 
in Study I as a function of intentionality, 
compensation, and intensity of suffering* 
Group Mean perceived attractiveness 
Volunteer-Compensâtion-High 58.5 
Volunteer-Compensation-Low 75. 3 
Volunteer-No compensation-High 54. 1 
Volunteer-No compensation-Low 71.4 
Fate-Compensation-High 59.7 
Fate-Compensation-Low 69.6 
Fate-No compensation-High 78.8 
Fate-No compensation-Low 77.5 
IN = 8 for all groups. 
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volunteered to suffer was more attractive than an 
uncompensated voluntary beneficent victim. 
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STUDY II 
Study II was undertaken to determine the reliability and 
generality of the results of study I. This was done by 
changing the subject's role in the situation from coactor to 
pure observer so that she could focus more clearly on the 
suffering of the beneficent victim, by employing different 
operational definitions of intensity of suffering and fate as 
the determiner of who suffers, and by adding a second measure 
of attraction to the victim. 
Once again, the following hypothesis from attribution 
theory and the just world hypothesis were tested; From 
attribution theory: 1) a victim whose suffering benefits an 
observer should be liked, 2) greater suffering should lead to 
greater attraction to a beneficent victim, 3) compensation 
for suffering should attenuate these general effects of 
beneficial suffering, and 4) a voluntary beneficent victim 
should be liked more that a victim of fate. From the just 
world hypothesis, these competing hypotheses were derived: 
1) the beneficial nature of the suffering is irrelevant to 
the perceived attractiveness of the victim, 2) greater 
suffering should lead to less attraction, 3) compensation for 
suffering should attenuate these general effects of 
suffering, and 4) attraction to a voluntary victim should be 
a function of the instrumental value of the victim's 
outcomes. If the hypotheses derived from the just world 
2% 
hypothesis are supported once again, added weight will be 
given to the inferences made in Study I concerning observers' 
reactions to suffering in others. Thus Study II was designed 
to extend the findings of Study I to include alternate 
operational definitions of fate and intensity of suffering as 
well as a different orientation for the subject in the 
experiment and another measure of the perceived 
attractiveness of a beneficent victim. 
Method 
Design. Procedure, and Subjects 
This experiment was advertised as an investigation into 
the ability to transmit impressions without using words. In 
this particular case, the ability to infer the tasteability 
of foods from the nonverbal reactions of another to the taste 
of the foods was under study. 
Because of the cover story, several changes in design 
and operationalization of variables was necessary. Since it 
was decided to operationalize intensity of suffering by 
having the confederate taste both "good" and "bad" foods, the 
design was altered from a 7 degree of freedom experiment to 
one of 5 degrees of freedom. The two conditions dropped were 
Volunteer-Pay-Good and Fate-Pay-Good. This was done to avoid 
suspicion that might arise from paying someone to eat good 
tasting foods. A second change in design involved the 
subject's orientation within the experiment. Here, the 
subject's role was changed from one of coactor to one of pure 
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observer. Consequently, the subject did not taste and rate 
the foods, but rated the tasteability of each food on the 
basis of the confederate's reactions while tasting them. In 
addition, the operationalization of fate as determiner of 
suffering was also changed. The subject and the confederate 
each drew a slip of paper from a box of two with the 
confederate declaring her slip to say "Taster" even though 
both slips said "Rater." 
A change was also made in the measurement process. 
Besides using the goodness and likability ratings as a 
dependent measure, the Interpersonal Judgement Scale used by 
Byrne (1969) to assess attraction was included as a second 
measure of attraction (Appendix C) . This was done to be sure 
the findings of Study I were not specific to one measure of 
perceived attractiveness. Other than these changes in 
design, operationalization of variables, and measurement, the 
method of Study I was followed. 
Forty-eight female volunteers were randomly assigned to 
six experimental conditions. Once again, when the subject 
arrived for the experiment, she was greeted by the 
experimenter and introduced to the female confederate who was 
described as another introductory psychology student. 
Following this, the experimental manipulations were carried 
out in the same manner as in Study I. The confederate 
"tasted" the foods by pretending to eat the contents of five 
empty cups. The subject was seated at a table ten feet away 
26 
from the confederate and rated each food's tasteability on a 
ten point scale anchored by the words "Good" and "Bad." The 
average tasteability rating given the "good" foods (mean = 
5.0) was considerably higher than that given the "bad" foods 
(mean = 2.6), suggesting that the intensity of suffering 
manipulation was successful. 
Results and Discussion 
Separate intentionality by compensation and 
intentionality by intensity of suffering analyses of variance 
were conducted on the two measures of perceived 
attractiveness of the victim (Appendix D). Although this 
procedure did not allow complete independence of the data 
used in the two analyses, it did provide more appropriate 
error terms for testing the two-way interactions, since the 
three-way interaction was far from significant in Study I, 
the confounding was not considered serious, 
Using this method of analysis indicated that the 
intentionality by compensation interaction found in Study I 
was replicated in Study II for both measures of victim 
perceived attractiveness. The intensity of suffering main 
effect was also in the appropriate direction, but was not 
statistically significant for either dependent measure. A 
summary of the average perceived attractiveness ratings for 
the beneficent victim appears in Table 2 for both dependent 
measures. As can be seen by comparing Table 1 with Table 2, 
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Table 2. Mean perceived attractiveness scores for the victim 
in Study II as a function of intentionality, 
compensation, and intensity of suffering* 
Group Mean perceived attractiveness 
Volunteer-Compensation-High 79. 9 
Volunteer-No compensation-High 77. 6 
Volunteer-No compensation-Low 66. 6 
Fate-Compensâtion-High 63. 4 
Fate-No compensation-High 74. 0 
Fate-No compensation-Low 69. 6 
IN = 8 for all groups. 
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the interaction of the victim's personal responsibility for 
suffering with the amount of compensation is identical in 
form for both studies. Simple effects tests indicated the 
same pattern of significance as found in Study I. 
Thus, the just world hypothesis appears once again to be 
more useful than attribution theory in explaining the 
perceived attractiveness of a beneficent victim. This 
tentative conclusion holds when the observer's role is that 
of coactor or pure observer. Giving esteem for favors as 
suggested by Heider (1958) does not seem to hold when 
performance of the favor involves suffering. This conclusion 
holds under a variety of operational definitions of victim 
intentionality, compensation, and intensity of suffering, 
attesting to the reliability of the results. 
The finding that greater suffering leads to lower 
perceived attractiveness of a beneficent vxctxis can be 
interpreted as a just world phenomenon and is consistent with 
other findings concerning reactions to victims (Stokols & 
Schopler, 1973; Chaikin 6 Darley, 1973). More intense 
suffering should threaten a belief in justice for all to a 
greater extent than mild suffering and result in the victim 
being rated lower in attractiveness. 
The finding that an uncompensated volunteer is perceived 
as less attractive than an uncompensated victim of fate is 
also consistent with previous research on reactions to 
29 
suffering in others. For example, Lerner (1971) found a 
willing martyr to be the least attractive of victims, while 
Lerner (Note 2) found a victim of fate to be the most 
attractive of the victims in that study. Therefore, in the 
present study an uncompensated victim of fate would be 
expected to be perceived as more attractive than an 
uncompensated voluntary victim. Lerner has suggested that 
subjects in the uncompensated volunteer conditions feel that 
by not volunteering they have indirectly caused the victim's 
suffering. Therefore, in order to reduce guilt, which 
results from their allowing another to suffer, the observer's 
perceive the victim as an undesirable individual who deserved 
the suffering. The role of expiation of guilt in attenuating 
the tendency to label a voluntary uncompensated victim as 
undesirable needs to be investigated in future research. An 
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reactions to suffering is made in Study V of the present 
investigation. 
Although general support for the just world rather than 
attribution theory was obtained in Study I and Study II, 
there is one finding in both studies which is inconsistent 
with the just world, but which is consistent with previous 
research on reactions to suffering in others. This finding 
concerns an uncompensated victim of fate being more 
attractive than a compensated victim of fate. One would 
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expect a compensated victim of fate to be more attractive 
than an uncompensated one if there is a belief in justice for 
all. This high degree of attraction to an uncompensated 
victim of fate has been explained as a "gratitude" reaction 
by Lerner and Matthews (1967). Even though the victim is not 
directly responsible for sparing the observer from suffering 
under fate conditions, it may be that the attribution of 
responsibility is not necessary for gratitude to develop. Or 
it may be that the observers ever attribute responsibility to 
the victim. Unfortunately, there were no measures of 
attribution of responsibility included in Studies I and II. 
However, Lerner and Matthews (1967) did find attributions of 
responsibility to accompany the "gratitude" reaction in the 
fate conditions of that study, lending some credibility to 
their interpretation. As Heider (1958, p. 257) points out, 
iûaîiy txûîes sj.sperceptxon of personal causalitv involves what 
we want to be, rather than intentionality. 
As pointed out earlier, lerner has suggested that 
gratitude accounts for the compensated victim of fate being 
perceived as less attractive than the uncompensated victim of 
fate, and that guilt accounts for the high degree of 
perceived goodness and likability of an uncompensated victim 
of fate compared to an uncompensated voluntary victim. Both 
the guilt and gratitude interpretations offered by Lerner 
involve the attribution of responsibility to the victim. 
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Thus the attribution of responsibility seems to operate in 
contradictory ways, depending on which interpretation is 
being offered. The contradictory nature of these 
interpretations points out several problems with post hoc 
explanations. 
First, post hoc explanations suggesting gratitude, 
guilt, and other cognitive states add nothing to the 
understanding of observers* reactions to the suffering of 
others. For example, one might call the low degree of 
attraction to the compensated victim of fate the "envy" 
reaction where the observer becomes angry at the victim for 
taking the money, leaving the observer uncompensated. 
Second, Lerner's explanation of the differential perceived 
attractiveness of these laboratory victims is not very 
convincing and points up the flexibility of his cognitive 
explanation of reactions to suffering and the need for 
further research on the role of fate and compensation in 
determining reactions to victims. Finally, the factors that 
threaten a belief in justice for all need to be 
systematically investigated to determine if the attribution 
of responsibility to the victim is influencing beliefs about 
justice that then affect the attraction response. If the 
attribution of responsibility is important, then future 
research on reactions to victims should routinely examine the 
impact of situational variables such as the intensity of 
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suffering on both attributional process and the attraction 
response. This research strategy should help determine the 
limitations of Lerner's just world hypothesis as an 
explanation of reactions to suffering. The unfortunate 
aspect of explanations in terms of gratitude guilt is that 
they do not help us understand, predict, or control 
observers' reactions to suffering in others. 
Regardless of these problems in interpretation, the 
results of these first two studies imply that observing human 
suffering may lead to rejection of the victim, even when such 
suffering is beneficial to the observer and is undeserved. 
33 
STUDY III 
Although the just world hypothesis provided some 
assistance in explaining reactions to the suffering of a 
beneficent victim observed in Study I and II, neither study 
sheds any light on the motive behind distortions of the 
victim's perceived attractiveness. Simply asserting that a 
threat to a belief in justice for all could motivate these 
distortions provides no clues as to methods of preventing 
rejection of victims of misfortune. Perhaps another approach 
can aid in the understanding, prediction and control of the 
tendency to derogate victims, study III was designed from 
social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) and attribution 
theory principles to gain understanding of how 
observer-victim relationships and the social desirability of 
the victim's pre-suffering behavior can influence reactions 
to suffering. Specifically, the tendency to reject victims 
was studied under conditions of perceived similarity or 
dissimilarity of the observer and victim, and under 
conditions of socially desirable or undesirable pre-suffering 
behavior on the victim's part. 
Other than feeling a threat to a belief in justice for 
all, there are other reasons for an observer to perceive a 
victim as unlikable. For example, when people believe others 
are similar to them, the fate of those similar others becomes 
important because similar ethers are perceived as having a 
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common fate (Heider, 1958, p. 210), and are perceived as 
embodying acceptable standards for social comparison 
(Festinger, 1954). These similar others are used for social 
comparison since they provide us with accurate information 
about our probable fates, Usually similarity induces 
positive sentiment (attraction), but when observers fear that 
they may share a misfortune with similar others, a tendency 
towards dissociation occurs. This dissociation tendency may 
be manifested in rejection of the similar other. Evidence 
concerning the role of perceived similarity leading to lower 
perceived attractiveness of a victim has been reported by 
Novak and Lerner (1968) using a mental patient as the victim, 
by Lerner and Agar (1972) using a drug addict as the victim, 
and by Taylor and Mette (1971) using a belligerent 
confederate. 
& second reason for an observer to perceive a victim of 
an injustice as bad and un likable, other than a belief in 
justice for all, is the victim's assumed character prior to 
suffering. If the victim is viewed initially as an 
undesirable individual, suffering is not likely to lead to 
attraction to the victim. Socially inappropriate behavior on 
the victim's part prior to suffering can adversely affect 
attraction to the victim. There is a primacy effect of the 
victim's pre-suffering behavior which can lead to a stable 
negative impression of the victim's character (Jones S 
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Goethals, 1971), Thus the victim will be low in perceived 
attractiveness regardless of perceived similarity or 
suffering because bad people are assumed to do socially 
undesirable things. 
The general purpose of Study III is to determine if 
increased attraction ratings of a victim may be produced by 
the joint effects of perceived similarity of the victim and 
observer and the social desirability of the victim's 
pre-suffering behavior, attribution theory combined with 
social comparison theory predicts that either perceived 
similarity or reprehensible behavior of the victim will 
provide sufficient conditions for rejection of the victim. 
Reprehensible pre-suffering behavior should provide negative 
characterlogical information which leads to derogation. 
Here, the victim's character provides a ready made 
justification for the suffering, perceived similarity of the 
observer and victim should lead to derogation because the 
suffering of similar others produces a tendency toward 
dissociation. It follows that liking for a victim will be 
lowest if there is perceived similarity of the observer and 
victim or the victim exhibits reprehensible pre-suffering 
behavior. On the other hand, if the victim is perceived to 
be dissimilar and displays socially appropriate pre-suffering 
behavior, attribution theory and social comparison theory 
predict that the tendency to perceive the victim as 
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unattractive is likely to be attenuated and the victim's 
perceived attractiveness should be at its peak. This effect 
of perceived dissimilarity should occur because the victim's 
fate should create no strain toward dissociation. Socially 
appropriate behavior on the victim's part should lead to 
greater perceived attractiveness of the victim because it is 
consistent to like someone who behaves appropriately. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Subjects were 40 males who participated in the 
experiment to receive extra credit for a course in 
introductory psychology. Males were used because cultural 
norms would seem to constrain the acceptable behaviors for a 
male threatened by the possibility of being shocked more so 
than for a threatened female. This change in the definition 
of suffering was made in an attempt to achieve a more 
powerful manipulation with greater impact on the observer. 
Four treatment conditions were formed by crossing two levels 
of perceived personality similarity of the subject and 
confederate (similar-dissimilar) with two levels of social 
desirability of the confederate's pre-suffering behavior 
(desirable-undesirable). Thirty-two subjects were randomly 
assigned to these four conditions, while eight subjects were 
run under control conditions which involved viewing the 
confederate suffer without the opportunity to assess the 
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social desirability of the confederate's pre-suffering 
behavior or gain knowledge of similarity. This control 
condition provided an estimate of the baseline perceived 
attractiveness of the confederate produced by suffering 
alone. 
Procedure 
The study was advertised as a dual experiment with 
one-half dealing with perception of emotional reactions and 
the other half as a study of learning and personality. When 
the subject arrived for the experiment, the confederate was 
introduced as another introductory psychology student. Both 
participants were given a bogus personality inventory (Test 
Anxiety Questionnaire; Handler and Sarason, 1952). The 
results from this bogus personality schedule were used to 
create perceived personality similarity or dissimilarity of 
the subject and confederate. In the szmilar conditions, the 
experimenter remarked how unusual it was to find two people 
with such similar results, as he was handing back the 
personality profiles supposedly derived from the test. In 
the dissimilar conditions he remarked how unusual it was to 
find two people so dissimilar when he gave the participants 
the bogus profiles (Appendix E) . Each profile had five 
dimensions (fear of failure, anxiety, self-control, 
physiological reactivity, and need for admiration) and a 
guestion asking the participants to rate the accuracy of 
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their personality profile (very inaccurate - 1, very accurate 
- 99). In each condition, the social desirability and 
extremity of the reported profiles were counterbalanced to 
avoid any effect on self-esteem the subject's profile might 
produce. From that point on the basic procedure of Lerner 
and Simmons (1966) was followed except the confederate's 
pre-suffering behavior was varied. 
Following the return of the profiles, it was established 
that one of the participants was to take part in a study of 
ability to learn paired-associates. The other participant 
was to be an observer. Boles were decided by the confederate 
and subject choosing folded slips of paper from a box. The 
participants were told that cne of the slips said "Learner" 
and the other "Observer," but in actuality, both read 
"Observer," As in study II, however, the confederate claimed 
to have obtained a slip which read "learner." The order of 
choice was counterbalanced to minimize attribution of 
responsibility effects found by Lerner and Matthews (1967). 
It was then explained that shock given for incorrect 
answers would be used as a motivator to speed learning of the 
paired-associates. In the socially undesirable conditions, 
the confederate panicked and acted cowardly when told of the 
shocks. In these conditions, the confederate gave no 
rational reason for being afraid of the shock, and appeared 
frightened. In the socially desirable conditions, he balked 
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at the possibility of being shocked, but displayed no 
irrational fear. Instead, he hesitated to participate due to 
his rational concern that the shock might be excessive or 
physically harmful. In all cases, the experimenter was 
eventually able to "persuade" the confederate to participate 
for "the advancement of science." 
At this point, the subject and confederate filled out a 
questionnaire supposedly designed to ensure that both 
participants understood exactly what their roles were to be 
(Appendix F). Actually, this questionnaire served as a check 
on the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations and 
the subjects* perceptions of the situation. This 
questionnaire included items concerned with the subject's 
impressions about his own and the confederate's emotional 
reactions to their respective roles in the experiment, and 
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theories under investigation are cognitive in nature, 
assessment of the subject's cognitions is necessary to ensure 
that they are consistent with the theory. The experimenter 
and confederate then went down to the learning lab and turned 
on a standard videotape similar to that used by Lerner and 
Simmons (1966) which the subject viewed on a closed circuit 
television monitor in his experimental cubicle. 
After viewing the videotape of the confederate being 
painfully shocked ten times while learning the 
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paired-associates, the subject was asked to give his 
impressions of the "other subject" on the standard scales. 
As before, the average of the goodness and likability ratings 
composed the dependent measure. 
In the control condition, the experimenter gave the 
subject the bogus personality test, returned counterbalanced 
profiles, and exposed the subject to the videotape. These 
subjects were told that the person they were to observe had 
volunteered for an experiment, only to find that it involved 
determining the effects of electric shocks for mistakes on 
the ability to learn paired-associates. Following the 
videotape, these subjects gave their impression ratings of 
the "other subject." Following the perceived attractiveness 
ratings, all subjects were debriefed and dismissed. 
Results and Discussion 
treated as proportions and transformed to standard normal 
deviates prior to analysis. 
Manipulation Checks 
The question at the bottom of the personality profile 
and the questions given before viewing the videotape served 
as checks on the experimental manipulations. The control 
group was not included in the analysis of these questions, 
since those subjects did not respond to the questionnaire. 
Thus, a 2 X 2 analysis of variance with perceived similarity 
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and social desirability of the confederate's pre-suffering 
behavior as the between subjects factors was conducted on 
each question. 
Analysis of the ratings of the accuracy of the bogus 
personality profiles indicated no significant differences for 
treatment conditions, with overall accuracy being rated as 
accurate (mean = 67). Ratings of perceived similarity were 
also analyzed and showed the subjects in the similar 
conditions to have perceived themselves as being 
significantly more similar tc the confederate (mean = 47.2) 
than those in the dissimilar conditions (mean = 59.1), 
F(1,28) = 3.87, £ < .05. The question dealing with the 
confederate's reaction to the possibility of being shocked 
revealed that in the irrational fear conditions the 
confederate was perceived as significantly more reluctant 
(Dsean = 77.5) than in the rational fear conditions (nean = 
59.7), F (1,28) = 8.86, g < ,006). The frequencies associated 
with the question concerning the confederate's perceived 
emotional reaction to his role in the learning experiment are 
presented in Table 3. A chi square test computed using 
desirable-undesirable and frightened or terrified-other as 
the classes indicated the confederate's perceived 
emotionality to vary with social desirability of his 
pre-suffering behavior as expected (chi square = 6.0, g < 
.02). Since this chi square was computed after collapsing 
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Table 3. Frequencies for confederate's emotional reaction 
in study III 
Group Frightened or Terrified Other 
Similar-Undesirable 4 4 
Similar-Desirable 0 8 
Dissimilar-Undesirable 3 5 
Dissimilar-Desirable 1 7 
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across categories, the probability level associated with the 
test statistic is not completely accurate. An analysis of 
variance conducted on the subjects' reactions to being spared 
from shock indicated a marginally significant tendency for 
the subjects to be more enthusiastic in the irrational fear 
conditions (mean = 29.7) than in the rational conditions 
(mean = 40.6), F (1,28) = 3.51, £ < .06. The frequencies 
associated with the question concerning the subjects* own 
emotional reaction to being spared from shock appear in Table 
4. A chi square computed using experimental condition and 
overjoyed or happy-other as classes indicated the subjects 
tended to feel glad about being spared the shock in all cases 
(chi square = 1.42, £ < .70). Once again, the probability 
associated with this test statistic is not accurate. 
Victim's Perceived Attractiveness 
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regression analysis of the victim's perceived attractiveness 
ratings (i.e., average of gocdness and likability ratings). 
This model allowed single degree of freedom contrasts of: 1) 
the control group mean with the average of all other groups, 
2) perceived similarity versus dissimilarity, 3) socially 
desirable versus undesirable pre-suffering behavior, and 4) 
the interaction of perceived similarity and the social 
desirability of the victim's pre-suffering behavior (Appendix 
G), The interaction term proved to be the only significant 
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Table 4, Frequencies for subject's emotional reaction 
in Study III 
Group Overjoyed or Happy other 
Similar-Undesirable 3 5 
Similar-Desirable 4 4 
Dissimilar-Undesirable 2 6 
Dissimilar-Desirable 4 4 
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source of variation in the model. 
A summary of the subjects' responses for victim 
perceived attractiveness appears in Table 5. Simple effects 
tests indicated the perceived attractiveness of the 
dissimilar socially desirable victim to be greater than that 
of all other victims except the control group victim 
(smallest t(35) = 2.36, £ < .05), The control group victim 
was perceived as significantly more attractive than the 
dissimilar, undesirable victim (t(35) = 2.02, £ < .05). 
The interaction of perceived similarity and social 
desirability of the victim's pre-suffering behavior is a 
meaningful and theoretically relevant finding in this study. 
The tendency to perceive the similar victim as unattractive, 
regardless of the social desirability of the victim's 
pre-suffering behavior was not statistically significant 
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.10) but suggests that labeling an innocent victim of fate as 
undesirable may occur purely on the basis of perceived 
similarity. Thus rejection may occur because the observer, 
finding himself/herself similar to an innocent victim of 
fate, concludes that a similar misfortune could have befallen 
him/her. Even impeccable behavior does not reduce the 
tendency to reject a victim of fate who is perceived as 
similar by the observer. The rejection tendency produced by 
perceived similarity could have been removed by the observers 
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Table 5. Mean perceived attractiveness scores for the victim 
in Study III as a function of perceived 
personality similarity of the victim and observer 
and the social desirability of the victim's 
pre-suffering behaviori 




Dissimilar-Desirable 78. 1 
Control-Control 72.7 
IN = 8 for all groups. 
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misperceiving their similarity to the victim. This 
manipulation checks indicate that the observers did not 
employ this form of dissociation. Thus the observers in the 
similar conditions were motivated to dissociate themselves 
from the victim by labeling the victim as a bad, unlikable 
person who deserves the painful shocks. 
The tendency to perceive a victim who behaves in a 
socially unacceptable manner as unattractive, regardless of 
perceived similarity suggests rejection of some victims to 
result from the attribution of undesirable personal 
attributes to the victim which are consistent with his/her 
reprehensible pre-suffering behavior. The high degree of 
perceived attractiveness of the control group victim is also 
consistent with this interpretation. Since socially 
inappropriate behavior on the victim's part did not occur 
under control conditions, perceiving the victim as a bad, 
unlikable person is not logical. 
In summary, the hypotheses tested in Study III included 
the prediction that attraction to a victim will be high if 
the victim is perceived to be dissimilar by the observer and 
behaves in a socially appropriate manner prior to suffering; 
and that attraction to a victim will be low if the opposite 
conditions hold. The results supported these predictions and 
their subsequent interpretation suggests that compassion can 
be induced for victims by pointing out their essential 
(18 
dissimilarity to the observer and their lack of culpability. 
A useful suggestion that could not be deducted from a 
normative or post hoc explanation of reactions to victims. 
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SIDDY IV 
The results of Study III suggest that the observer's 
perceptions of the victim prior to suffering are important in 
determining attraction to victims. Taking the observer's 
perspective into account suggests a different sort of 
explanation of the results of Studies I and II than that 
offered earlier. The results to be explained were the 
greater degree of attraction to a mildly suffering beneficent 
victim compared to an intensely suffering one, and the 
greater attraction to a voluntary compensated beneficent 
victim compared to an uncompensated voluntary victim. 
Recall that the victim in Studies I and II became the 
observer's benefactor by agreeing to undergo suffering 
defined as tasting several bad tasting foods. It may have 
seemed strange to the observer that someone would volunteer 
to taste bad tasting foods for no compensation. The observer 
may have wondered whether the other person was making a crude 
attempt to ingratiate herself. As Heider points out (Heider, 
1958, p. 258), in his chapter on justice, there will be 
exploration of a benefactor's motives if the benefactor is 
not a friend. This relationship of beneficence and suspicion 
is important in understanding why the results of Study I and 
II did not appear to support attribution theory. 
Unfortunately, beneficial actions even if accidental can 
result in two different intentions being attributed to the 
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actor: 1) the intention to be helpful, and 2) the intention 
to ingratiate. The essential ambiguity of beneficent 
behavior of the suffering variety is produced by the extent 
to which ulterior motives may be served by the beneficent 
victim's suffering. This is especially important in 
interpretation of the results of Study I and II because 
Heider (1958) and Jones and Davis (1965) warn of the possible 
effects of attribution of an ulterior motive on the perceived 
attractiveness of a beneficent victim. Furthermore, those 
authors suggest that an observer is especially likely to be 
suspicious of another's motives if he/she voluntarily 
performs a costly favor for us, such as agreeing to undergo 
suffering in our place (Jones S Wortman, 1973, p. 20). Thus, 
the beneficent victim in Studies I and II was probably 
suspected of ingratiation by the observers, and the 
attribution theory prediction of returning estess for favors 
would not d-irectly apply. Hence a mildly suffering victim 
would be rated as more attractive than an intensely suffering 
victim because less suspicion would be aroused under mild 
suffering conditions, similarly, a compensated victim who 
volunteers to suffer would be rated as more likable than an 
uncompensated voluntary victim because compensation 
eliminates suspicion of an ulterior motive. Thus attribution 
theory in the form of ingratiation theory (Schopler, 1970; 
Jones 5 Wortman, 1973) offers an adequate explanation of the 
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results of Study I and II, which also predicts the perceived 
attractiveness of a beneficial other when the favor rendered 
involves sparing the observer from suffering. 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the ingratiation 
model can offer a post hoc explanation of the results of the 
first two studies of this investigation. Study IV was 
conducted to determine the extent to which beneficence leads 
to lowered perceived attractiveness of the victim because of 
attributions of manipulative intent by the observer to the 
victim. This goal was accomplished by replicating the 
effects of victim intentionality found in Studies I and II 
while requesting attributions of manipulative intent. A 
truly independent observer was also employed to see if 
beneficence leads to lowered attractiveness ratings in the 
absence of hedonic relevance for the observer. 
Frcr. attribution theory (Jones t- «ortsan,- 1973; it was 
predicted that: 1) independent observers would perceive the 
beneficent victim as more attractive than dependent 
observers, 2) under conditions of victim intentionality, 
dependent observers would perceive the victim as less 
attractive with attributions of manipulative intent being 
associated with lower attractiveness ratings, and 3) 
conditions of fate should attenuate the relationship of 
attributions of manipulative intent to perceived 
attractiveness of the beneficent victim for dependent 
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observers and lead to equally high perceived attractiveness 
of the beneficent victim for both independent and dependent 
observers. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Subjects were 32 female introductory psychology students 
who were randomly assigned to cells of a 2 X 2 factorial 
formed by crossing two levels of observer and victim 
interdependence of fates (dependent-independent) and two 
levels of victim intentionality regarding the suffering 
(fate-volunteer). 
Procedure 
Two separate experiments were advertised. The cover 
story for the subjects whose fates were dependent on the 
confederate's fate was similar to that used by Lerner and 
the effects of distraction on paired-associate learning. A 
second experimental description was provided on a separate 
sign-up sheet for the independent observers. The second 
experiment was advertised as involving observation only. 
Subjects were allowed to participate in only one of the "two" 
experiments. 
When the subjects arrived at the experimental waiting 
area, the confederate was already present. When the 
experimenter arrived, he greeted each participant by name and 
53 
introduced the participants. He then directed the group to 
go to the experimental lab area and sit at one of the tables. 
The confederate always took a pre-designated seat at the 
corner of the table. The experimenter unobtrusively recorded 
the distance from each subject to the confederate. This 
interpersonal distance measure was considered as an estimate 
of each subject's initial attraction to the confederate 
(Knapp, 1972) and was employed as a covariate in the data 
analysis to remove variability in the average goodness and 
likability ratings due to subjects* original attraction to 
the confederate. 
The experimenter then informed the participants that two 
of them were in an experiment concerning the effects of 
distraction on learning and the third was merely a 
participant observer in a separate experiment concerned with 
perception of emotional cues. The paired-associates task was 
then described and the nature of the electric shock to be 
used as the distractor explained. The participants 
identified as belonging in the learning experiment were told 
that "random" shocks would be administered to the participant 
learning the paired-associates. The shock was considered 
random because it would vary in intensity and would come at 
irregularly spaced time intervals. Thus, the shock in this 
experiment was not a supposed punishment for mistakes made on 
the paired-associates task. This change in procedure from 
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that in Study III was made in order to avoid the possible 
conclusion on the observers' part that the confederate is 
unintelligent and, hence, not a likable person. 
after the description of the task and shock either a 
coin was flipped to determine who would be the learner or a 
volunteer was requested. In either case the confederate 
became the learner by losing the toss or by volunteering. 
The dependent subject always became an observer like the 
independent subject. 
The experimenter then gave the confederate a copy of the 
paired-associates to study while he showed the two 
observer-subjects the learning lab and observation room. 
After seating the subjects at the television monitor in the 
observation room, the experimenter and confederate went into 
the learning lab and turned on a hidden videotape recorder 
Mhich presented a standard videotape of the confederate being 
painfully shocked ten times while learning the 
paired-associates. After the videotape, the confederate 
returned to her position at the table outside the learning 
lab. The experimenter directed the subjects to return to the 
table without specifying where they should sit. All subjects 
in all conditions returned to their initial seats, satisfying 
the assumption of the analysis of covariance that treatments 
have no effects on the covariate (Hays, 1973) , 
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The experimenter then gave each participant an 
impression rating form to be filled out (Appendix H). As in 
Study I and II the confederate asked to be excused before she 
could fill out the rating form, claiming that she was not 
feeling well. She subseguently exited and proceeded to the 
waiting area to prepare for the next pair of subjects. The 
dependent measure consisted of the usual trait ratings, but 
also included questions concerning: 1) the perception of a 
conscious strategy on the confederate's part to get the 
observers to like her, 2) perceptions of the confederate's 
freedom to leave the experiment, 3) perceptions of the 
confederate's personal responsibility for being shocked, U) 
the extent to which the confederate deserved the shocks, 5) 
whether or not the observer thought the shocks were painful, 
6) the observer's estimate of how many shocks the confederate 
received, and 7) estimates cf how angry the confederate was 
about her role in the learning experiment. After filling out 
the dependent measure, the subjects were informed of the 
experimental ruse and dismissed. 
Results and Discussion 
Victim Perceived Attractiveness 
After the appropriate transformation, a 2 X 2 analysis 
of covariance was conducted on the attraction scores (average 
of goodness and likability ratings), using initial 
interpersonal distance as the covariate and victim 
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intentionality and interdependence of subject and victim 
fates as between subjects factors (Appendix I). The 
significant sources of variation identified in the analysis 
were interdependence of the victim and observer fates, and an 
interaction of interdependence and victim intentionality. A 
summary of the average perceived attractiveness ratings of 
the victim in each condition adjusted for initial 
interpersonal distance appears in Table 6, 
As can be seen in the table, the nature of the 
interdependence by victim intentionality interaction supports 
attribution theory in the form of ingratiation theory. 
Lowered attraction ratings of the beneficent victim occur 
only in the voluntary condition with a dependent observer. 
Relation of Victim Perceived Attractiveness to Other Measures 
To investigate the motive for lowered attraction 
ratings, correlations among ratings of the victim's: 1) 
manipulative intent, 2) personal responsibility for 
suffering, 3) freedom to leave the experiment, 4) 
deservingness of the shock, 5) estimated number of shocks 
received, and 6) perceived attractiveness were computed 
within each experimental group. These within-cell 
correlations appear in Table 7. 
The correlations in Table 7 indicate that the only 
variables significantly related to the victim's perceived 
attractiveness are attributions of personal responsibility 
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Table 6. Mean perceived attractiveness scores for the 
in study IV adjusted for initial attraction 
and as a function of intentionality and 
interdependence of fatesi 
Group Adjusted mean perceived attractiveness 
Volunteer-Independent 85 .2 
Volunteer-Dependent 70 .0 
Fate-Independent 82 .6 
Fate-Dependent 85 .2 
IN = 8 for all groups. 
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Table 7, within-cell correlations for Study I7i 
Independent observers 
Variable MI R F D S A 
Manipulative Intent (HI) - .79 .13 .60 -.39 .64 
Responsibility (E) -.05 - -.08 .96* .18 .58 
Freedom (F) .08 -.02 — -.11 .01 -.40 
Deserving (D) -.39 -.19 .26 - .44 .48 
Shocks (S) .19 -.50 -.44 -.34 - -.13 
Attraction (A) -.7 9* - .35 -.10 .33 .35 — 
Dependent observers 
Variable MI R F D S A 




 -.37 . 35 .35 -.16 
Responsibility (R) .71* - -.86* .84* -. 12 -.24 
Freedom (F) ,02 .35 - -.64 ,26 . 38 
Deserving (D) .41 .75* .35 - .32 -.11 
Shocks (S) - .40 -.14 .32 .05 - -. 12 
Attraction (A) -.72» -.70* .09 -.56 .34 — 
»£ < .05 
ipate conditions are above the main diagonal, 
volunteer below. 
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and manipulative intent. These negative relationships occur 
only in the voluntary conditions. However, attributions of 
personal responsibility only lead to lowered perceived 
attractiveness ratings when accompanied by attributions of 
manipulative intent. The positive relationship between 
attributions of manipulative intent and victim personal 
responsibility suggests that attribution of responsibility to 
the beneficent victim is necessary for attributions of 
manipulative intent to produce lowered attraction ratings. 
It is apparent that lowered perceived attractiveness 
ratings occur under conditions of victim intentionality and 
interdependence of the victim and observer's fates. These 
two conditions define beneficence; that special case of 
observer-victim relationships where the victim's suffering 
benefits the observer. 
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STUDY V 
The first four studies of this investigation into 
reactions to victims have been primarily concerned with the 
understanding of reactions to suffering in laboratory 
settings. These studies may have high internal validity, but 
what about their generalizability to real life situations? 
The ideal strategy for science seems to be movement back and 
forth from the lab to the field. This strategy should 
provide maximum ecological validity of results concerning the 
determinants of reactions to suffering and allow us to place 
greater confidence in the applicability of lab findings to 
the real world, unfortunately the author is aware of only 
one experimental field study in the literature which has 
attempted to investigate reactions to real life victims. The 
authors of that study, Rubin and Peplau (1973), were 
interested in reactions of an observer to his own and other's 
fates in the 1971 draft lottery. Unfortunately, the 
observers' lottery numbers tended to fall toward the "bad" 
end of the scale making interpretation difficult. However, 
the authors of that study also developed the Belief in a Just 
World Scale, a twenty-item scale in the revised version which 
requires the individual to state his/her degree of agreement 
with a variety of questions concerned with justice (Appendix 
J). This scale was designed to measure the strength of an 
individual's belief in justice for all. 
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The purpose of Study V was to investigate reactions to a 
group of real life victims of war, Viet Namese Refugees under 
varying degrees of social interdependence. The impact of a 
belief in justice for all on perceptions of the Viet Namese 
Refugees was also investigated by using the Belief in a Just 
World Scale to measure individual differences in beliefs 
about justice. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Thirty females ages 20-25 who lived in university 
married student housing at Iowa State University and who 
volunteered for the experiment were the subjects. The design 
consisted of three groups whose fates varied in 
interdependence relative to Viet Namese Refugees. Subjects 
were interviewed in their homes following random assignment 
to groups. One-half of the subjects in each group eere 
interviewed by a female experimenter and the other one-half 
were interviewed by a male experimenter. 
Procedure 
The experimenter knocked on the prospective subject's 
door. When the subject came to the door, the experimenter 
stated that he/she was from the Iowa State University 
Psychology Department and was conducting an experiment in 
married student housing. The experimenter then asked the 
subject if she would volunteer to fill out an opinion survey 
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(Appendix K). If the subject agreed (30 of 33 did agree), 
the'experimenter then asked her to read the directions at the 
top of the opinion survey. 
After the subject read the directions, the experimenter 
answered any questions and proceeded with the experimental 
manipulations. One of the three groups was a control group 
and received no further instructions. As far as this group 
was concerned, their fates were not linked to the fate of the 
Viet Namese Refugees. A second group was low in social 
interdependence. That group was told that Iowa State was 
bringing a group of Viet Namese Refugees to the campus to 
teach them agriculture. This group of Viet Namese Refugees 
were to be housed in Pammel Court. (Pammel Court is the 
lowest level of married student housing and is separate from 
University Village where the subjects live.) They were then 
told that ]Lf enough unoccupied units were not available to 
house the Viet Namese Refugees, some leases of the present 
occupants would not be renewed for the following year. These 
leases would be chosen at random by the housing department. 
The group whose fate was high in social interdependence with 
respect to the hypothetical Viet Namese Refugees was told the 
same thing with the exception that the Viet Namese Refugees 
were to be housed in University Village where the subjects 
live. Following these differential instructions, the 
subjects filled out the opinion survey. 
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The opinion survey consisted of two parts. The first 
part included the usual trait ratings in response to the 
question "Compared to the average American, the average Viet 
Hamese Refugee is...", which constituted the main dependent 
measure. This part of the survey also contained some filler 
items concerning willingness to help the Refugees, the 
Refugees* responsibility in their own suffering, and any 
feelings of guilt, sorrow, and deserving the subjects' felt 
about the Refugees' suffering. The second part of the survey 
consisted of the revised Belief in a Just World Scale (Rubin 
6 Peplau, 1973, p. 79) . 
When the subject finished the survey, the experimenter 
explained the deception involved and explained the rational 
behind the experiment. All subjects reacted very positively 
to the experiment and considered the experiment valuable in 
helping to understand attitudes tovard victims= All but one 
of the subjects requested a copy of the results and seemed 
interested in finding out how other people responded to the 
questions. 
Results and Discussion 
The Belief in a Just World Scale was scored so that a 
high score indicated a strong belief in justice for all. 
Since scores on this scale did not vary with experimental 
condition (F(2,29) = .33, £ < .72), it was used as a 
covariate in analyzing the perceived attractiveness ratings 
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given for the Viet Namese Refugees. There were no 
differences in responding to the opinion survey attributable 
to sex of experimenter. Thus, sex of experimenter was 
ignored in the analysis reducing the design to a one-way 
analysis of covariance. 
Victim Perceived Attractiveness 
Following transformation to normal deviates, regression 
analysis was performed on the average of the goodness and 
likability ratings given for the Refugees using experimental 
group and belief in just world scores as predictors. The 
scores from the Belief in a Just World Scale were employed as 
a covariate in the analysis by entering them last in the 
prediction equation (Appendix L). This analysis indicated a 
significant effect for group classification regardless of a 
belief in justice for all. It was interesting to note that 
the significant beta weight for the regression of scores from 
the Belief in a Just World Scale on ratings of the Refugees' 
perceived attractiveness had a positive sign. This suggests 
that compassion is associated with a belief in justice for 
all rather than rejection as lerner (1974) has suggested. 
A summary of the subject's ratings of the perceived 
attractiveness of a Viet Namese Refugee adjusted for a belief 
in justice for all is presented in Table 8. These means tend 
to decrease as the Refugees coming to Iowa State increases in 
hedonic relevance for the subject. The greatest degree of 
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Table 8. Mean perceived attractiveness scores for Viet 
Namese Refugees in Study V adjusted for a belief 
in justice for all and as a function of the 
hedonic relevance of the Refugees' fate for the 
observer! 
Group Adjusted mean perceived attractiveness 
High Hedonic Relevance 66. 6 
Low Hedonic Relevance 60.2 
No Hedonic Relevance 82.5 
IN = 10 for all groups. 
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perceived attractiveness occurs in the control group and the 
least in the group who thought the Refugees were to be housed 
in University village. Apparently the subjects did not 
particularly like victims who threaten to compete for limited 
resources. It seems as though this rejection response 
applies even if the victim threatens to compete for limited 
resources with other members of the subject's peer group. 
Thus the magnitude of the rejection response was 
approximately equal for the groups who thought the Refugees 
were to be housed in Pammel Court and who thought the 
Refugees were to be housed in University Village. The 
typical immediate response of subjects in those two 
conditions was, "That's not fair.". 
Relation of Victim Perceived Attractiveness to Other Measures 
Pooled within-cell correlations were computed among 
perceived attractiveness ratings, scores froa the Belief in a 
Just World Scale, and the measures of guilt, sorrow, 
deserving, responsibility, and willingness to help the 
Refugees. These correlations appear in Table 9. 
In general, the relationships in Table 9 suggest that: 
1) the more the subject believed in justice for all, the more 
the subject liked the Refugees and the less responsibility 
the Refugees were seen as having for their suffering, 2) the 
more guilt about, and sorrow for the Refugees' suffering, the 
more aid the subject felt America should give the Refugees, 
Table 9. Pooled within-cell correlations for Study V 







American Aid (AA) 
Own Aid (OA) 
Belief in Justice (BJ) 
.0!> -.13 .05 -.05 -.08 -.14 .07 • 56* 
- .55* -.01 -.14 .05 .47* .54* .03 
-
— m U 8* -.15 -.40* .51* .36* -.20 










*£ < .05 
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and the more aid the subject herself was willing to give, 3) 
the more deservingness assigned the Refugees, the less sorrow 
felt for their plight and the greater the opportunity to 
avoid the suffering was assigned to the Refugees, 4) the 
greater the opportunity to avoid suffering, the more 
responsibility assigned to the Refugees for their plight, and 
5) the more guilt felt about the Refugees' suffering, the 
more sorrow felt for them. 
These correlations suggest that observer guilt and 
sorrow play a role in determining when aid will be offered a 
real victim, but do not affect the perceived attractiveness 
of a victim. The only variable associated with victim 
perceived attractiveness was a belief in justice for all. 
The positive relationship between a belief in a just world 
and the perceived attractiveness of a Viet Namese Refugee 
argues against Lerner's contention that derogation of a real 
victim results from the victim's suffering threatening a 
belief in justice for all. This relationship is consistent 
with the compassionate reaction of subjects in Rubin and 
Peplau's (1973) study of reactions to "winners" and "losers" 
in the 1971 draft lottery suggesting that we do not always 
reject the victim even though we believe that people 
generally get what they deserve. 
The tendency to advocate aid for the Refugees is 
consistent with the finding of Notz, Shaw, and Cook (1971) 
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that winners of the 1970 draft lottery were more likely than 
losers to advocate total withdrawal of troops from Viet Nam. 
Thus feelings of guilt and sorrow, and attributions of 
deserving and responsibility may not influence the perceived 
attractiveness of real life victims, but do influence 
willingness to help victims of misfortune. This generalized 
tendency for observers to advocate aid when feeling guilty 
may indicate that altruistic type behavior is motivated by 
feelings of guilt rather than a genuine concern for the 
welfare of others. 
The negative relationships between victim responsibility 
and willingness to aid the victim suggest that the above 
conclusion holds if the victim is blameless. This 
interpretation is congruent with Bryan and Davenport's (1968) 
analysis of contributions to the Hew York Times' appeal for 
aid to victims of misfortune. Those authors found that the 
greatest amount of money was contributed to a fund for 
victims of child abuse, while the smallest contributions were 
given for persons with psychological disorders. We seem to 
rationalize the suffering of the infirm through attributions 
of deserving and responsibility which alleviate our feelings 
of guilt and sorrow, but not the victim's suffering; and we 
react dispassionately to victims of social injustice if they 
are viewed as blameworthy rather than innocent. As in the 
first four studies of this investigation, the victim's 
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complete lack of culpability (personal responsibility) plays 
an important role in determining whether or not compassion 
will be the reaction to suffering. 
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SUMMARY AND THEORETICAL EXTENSION 
Summary 
In general, the results cf these five studies provide a 
start in understanding observers* reactions to suffering and 
suggest some theoretical constructs defined by the social 
context which influence perceptions of a victim. Before 
proceeding to the theoretical analysis, a brief review of the 
present findings will be given. The specific hypotheses and 
findings of each study are presented below to aid in 
summarizing the implications and conclusions of this 
investigation followed by an initial attempt at outlining 
some crucial variables which must be considered in an attempt 
to understand and explain reactions to suffering. The final 
section of this report includes an attempt to extend the 
theoretical analysis to a few real world social contexts. 
Study I tested these hypotheses derived from attribution 
theory: 1) a victim whose suffering benefits an observer 
should be liked, 2) greater suffering should lead to greater 
attraction to a beneficent victim, 3) compensation for 
suffering should attenuate these general effects of 
beneficial suffering, and U) a voluntary beneficent victim 
should be liked more than a victim of fate. From the just 
world hypothesis, these competing hypotheses were derived: 
1) the beneficial nature of the suffering is irrelevant to 
the perceived attractiveness of the victim, 2) greater 
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suffering should lead to less attraction, 3) compensation for 
suffering should attenuate these general effects of 
suffering, and H) attraction to a voluntary victim should be 
a function of the instrumental value of the victim's 
outcomes. The results appeared to support the just world 
hypothesis in that greater suffering led to less liking for 
the victim and a voluntary beneficent victim was liked more 
when highly compensated than when no compensation for 
suffering was available. 
Study II replicated Study I using different operational 
definitions of intensity of suffering and fate as the 
determiner of suffering. Results similar to those found in 
Study I were found for measures of the victim's goodness and 
likability, and for the victim's desirability as a work 
partner as the indices of attraction. 
Study III was conducted to establish whether or not 
lowered attraction to a victim results from the joint effects 
of perceived similarity of the victim and observer, and the 
social desirability of the victim's pre-suffering behavior. 
It was predicted that attraction to a victim will be at its 
lowest if: 1) there is perceived similarity of the observer 
and the victim, or 2) the victim exhibits reprehensible 
pre-suffering behavior, and that attraction to a victim will 
be at its peak if: 1) the victim is perceived as dissimilar 
by the observers, and 2) the victim displays socially 
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appropriate pre-suffering behavior. The results indicated a 
high degree of attraction to a victim who the observers 
believed to be dissimilar to themselves and who behaved in a 
socially appropriate manner before suffering. 
Study IV was undertaken to investigate the impact of 
victim intentionality and social interdependence of the 
victim and observer upon observers' attraction to the victim. 
From attribution theory it was predicted that: 1) observers 
whose fates are independent of the the victim's fate should 
perceive the victim as more attractive than observers whose 
fates are dependent upon the victim's fate, 2) under 
conditions of victim intentionality, dependent observers 
should perceive the victim as trying to make a good 
impression on the observers by volunteering to suffer, and 
that this perception will lead to the victim being labeled as 
a bad, unlikable person, while fate should eliminate these 
perceptions and corresponding labeling of the victim. The 
results directly support attribution theory and suggest that 
a beneficent victim is viewed as less attractive when he/she 
is viewed as responsible for his/her own suffering, his/her 
fate influences the fate of the observer and an ulterior 
motive is suspected by the observer. 
Finally, Study V was designed as a field experiment to 
investigate reactions to a group of real life victims, Viet 
Namese Pefugees. The results indicate that a victim will be 
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viewed as undesirable if he/she competes with the observer 
for a limited supply of resources. The results also suggest 
that feelings of guilt and sorrow influence our willingness 
to help victims of social injustice, but do not influence our 
beliefs concerning these victims* goodness and likability. 
Theoretical Extension 
An Extension of Attribution Theory 
Unfortunately the results of these five studies neither 
unequivocally supports the just world hypothesis nor 
attribution theory. Even though the just world hypotheiss 
appeared superior to attribution theory in predicting 
reactions to the suffering of a beneficent victim, this 
superiority was considerably diminished by the results of 
Study III and IV. The results of Studies III and V provided 
evidence that attribution theory may be more useful in 
understanding y predicting, and controlling observers* 
reactions to suffering in others than is the just world 
hypothesis. In defense of Lerner, it should be pointed out 
that even though his just world hypothesis does not seem to 
provide an adequate explanation of these findings, they may 
only point out limitations tc his theory. That is, the just 
world hypothesis may not apply to situations involving 
intimate contact with a victim. As with any norm or unstable 
behavioral tendency, powerful situational factors, such as 
personal involvement with the fate of another person, may 
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obscure effects due to a belief in justice for all. Since an 
extension or revision of Lerner*s approach did not appear 
possible or likely to yield explanation, prediction, and 
control of reactions to victims, it was decided to employ the 
concepts of attribution theory in an attempt to construct an 
attribution theory of reactions to suffering. Attribution 
theory was chosen because of its popularity, diversity of 
research findings already reported, the general support for 
predictions made from attribution theory in Studies III, IV, 
and Vg and because the observer engages in active attribution 
of traits and intentions when he/she evaluates the victim. 
As such, the observer utilizes joint behavior-situation cues 
to make inferences about the victim's character. Thus an 
extension of attribution theory to account for observers' 
reactions to suffering would seem appropriate. 
The behavioral cues employed by ar. observer in assigning 
traits to a victim include such things as: 1) the victim's 
intentionality regarding the suffering (Godfrey & Lowe, 
1975), 2) the social desirability of the victim's 
pre-suffering behavior (lerner s Lichtman, 1968), and the 
utility of agreeing to undergo suffering in making a good 
impression on others (Jones 8 Wortman, 1973). The 
situational factors influencing the observers' reactions are 
more numerous than the behavioral cues, but include; 1) 
experimenter demand effects (Lerner, 1971), 2) number of 
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other observers present (Aderman, Brehm, 5 Katz, 1973), 3) 
the presence of compensation for suffering (Lerner, 1971) , 
and U) the intensity of the victim's suffering (Chaikin & 
Darley, 1973; Stokols S Schopier, 1973). 
A special category of situational factors affecting 
observers' evaluation of a victim involves the social context 
in which the suffering occurs, A major dimension of the 
social context is defined by the observer's relationship to 
the victim. This dimension includes such variables as: 1) 
perceived similarity of the victim and observer (Novak & 
Lerner, 1968; Lerner & Agar, 1972) 2) the instructional set 
given the observers regarding empathy for the victim _ 
(Aderman, Brehm, 6 Katz, 1973), 3) the observers' degree of 
identification with the victim (Miller, Smith, Ferree, & 
Taylor, Note 3), 4) whether the observer is an active or 
passive partxcxpant (nxller S Norman, 1975) , 5) the 
beneficial nature of the victim's suffering with regard to 
the observer (Heider, 1958), 6) whether or not the observers' 
fate depends on what happens to the victim (Jones S Wortman, 
1973), and 7) the degree to which the observer is physically 
and psychologically detached (Stokols & Schopier, 1973). 
Interdependence and the Social Context The data 
reported here suggest that an important variable in the 
social context which affects distortions of a victim's 
character is interdependence of the subject's and victim's 
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fates. Thus a tendency to distort the victim's perceived 
attractiveness only occurs if the observer is intimately 
involved with the victim's fate. This involvement can come 
from engaging in similar activities, perceived similarity, 
the possibility of common fate, or the fact that one person's 
misfortune is another's boon. If interdependence is not 
present, the motive to distort the victim's character is not 
present. The control groups of Studies III and V and the 
independent observers of Study IV indicate the importance of 
interdependence in leading the observer to label the victim 
as undesirable. 
The concept of interdependence is less general than the 
concept of hedonic relevance of Jones and Davis (1965). When 
fates are interdependent, they are hedonically relevant. 
But, hedonically relevant fates are not always 
interdependent. For exazpls, the accidental death of a 
favorite pet is hedonically relevant because it is 
disappointing in that it removes a possible source of 
gratification. It does not, however, directly bear on one's 
own fate. On the other hand, competition for a limited 
supply of rewards as found in Study V constitutes 
interdependence with hedonic relevance. 
Although suffering which is viewed as beneficial by the 
observer may involve the attribution of responsibility, 
interdependence many times does not involve intentionality. 
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It is actually not dependent upon the victim's intentions 
since observers have a built in bias to attribute 
responsibility to actors (Shaw, 1972; Jones S Nisbett, 1971). 
A case in point is Lerner and Matthews' (1967) condition 
"Fates Independent" and the Fate-No compensation conditions 
of Studies I and II. The fates of the observer and victim in 
those conditions were not really independent, even though 
they were randomly determined. The fates of the observer and 
victim were interdependent because the subject's role as 
observer was determined solely by the confederate becoming 
the victim. From the subject' point of view, he/she could 
have become the "victim." Thus regardless of the 
confederate's intentions, the subject's fate was determined 
by the confederate's fate. Perhaps this interdependent 
nature of the social context is why the perceived 
attractiveness of the victis cf fate is enhanced by 
suffering. Thus the gratitude effect found here and in 
Lerner and Matthews' study can be explained in terms of the 
nature of the social context. 
A special subset of relationships where the victim's 
suffering benefits the observer is termed beneficence. 
Beneficence is related to the attribution of responsibility, 
hedonic relevance, and interdependence of fates. That is: 
1) if the victim is not perceived as intentionally suffering 
in order to help another, the behavior will not be considered 
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beneficent by an observer, 2) suffering can only be perceived 
as beneficent if it involves an attempt to provide positive 
outcomes for another, even if unsuccessful, and 3) suffering 
which leads to positive outcomes for someone other than the 
observer will be viewed as beneficent by the observer. As 
can be seen by the foregoing discussion, the essential 
requirement for perceived beneficence is attribution of 
responsibility to the victim. The victim must be perceived 
as aware that his/her agreeing to suffer will benefit another 
person. Thus, the victim is viewed as a necessary and 
sufficient cause of his/her own suffering. 
A Theoretical Network 
Given that interdependence of some form is present, the 
question becomes how can a theory about the attribution 
process help us understand and explain reactions to 
Suffering? By considering attribution as a process whereby 
observers assign meaning to ether persons and events in 
constructing a psychological reality, the contribution of 
attribution theory to understanding reactions to suffering 
becomes clear. The theoretical network presented here has 
three parts: 1) indicators in the social context which 
determine attributions, 2) the attributions made on the basis 
of these indicators, and 3) the ultimate effects of the 
social context on perceived attractiveness and helping. Both 
goodness and likability ratings and expression of intent to 
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benefit another person are considered indices of attraction. 
The social context indicators include such things as: 
the presence of rewards, the quality and quantity of the 
rewards present (money-love, $0-$2), the victim's 
intentionality regarding the suffering, the intensity and 
quality of suffering (5 shocKs-10 shocks, tasting "bad 
foods-being painfully shocked), perceived similarity of the 
observer and victim, and the social desirability of the 
victim's pre-suffering behavior. All of these variables were 
studied in the present investigation, but other variables 
could be important such as the number of observers present, 
or the degree of identification the observer feels with the 
victim. 
The attributions made on the basis of these indicators 
include: beneficence on the part of the victim, manipulative 
intent on the part of the victim, the degree to which the 
victim desired the consequences of his/her behavior, the 
degree to which the victim intended to threaten the 
observer's security, the observer's and victim's 
responsibility for the events which transpired, and most 
importantly, personal characteristics of the victim inferred 
from the victim's pre-suffering behavior. Not all of these 
attributions are of equal probability, and in fact some are 
mutually exclusive. For example, conditions of fate may make 
attributions of manipulative intent improbable but not affect 
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personal characteristics inferred from the victim's 
pre-suffering behavior, and attributions of beneficence and 
manipulative intent on the victim's part would seem to be 
mutually exclusive. 
Some factors which determine which attributions will be 
made by an observer involve such things as: the number of 
indicators present, the presence of contradictory indicators, 
the conspicuousness of each indicator, the assumed strength 
of the relationship between the indicators and the 
attribution to be made, and the consensus of assumed others. 
Each of these factors influences the number of, and the 
ultimate certainty of the attributions made. Future research 
should provide information concerning how these factors 
combine to determine the ultimate attribution made. 
The ultimate effects of the social context indicators on 
attraction to and helping of the victim depend on the 
factors influencing attributions. The present data suggest 
some relationships among the social context, attributions, 
and attraction-helping. The results of Studies I and II 
suggest that victim intentionality plus the presence of 
compensation for suffering probably leads to attributions of 
desire for consequences with a corresponding high degree of 
attraction to the victim. The results of Study III suggest 
that perceived similarity leads to attributions of threat to 
security which results in lowered attraction to a victim. 
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Study III also suggests that perceived dissimilarity and 
socially desirable pre-suffering behavior leads to 
attribution of desirable personal characteristics to the 
victim and a high degree of attraction. The control group of 
Study III suggests that the absence of social context 
indicators leads to a high degree of attraction even when the 
actor suffers. The results cf Study IV suggest that 
interdependence can lead to contradictory attributions of 
beneficence and manipulative intent, when accompanied by 
attribution of responsibility. If both manipulative intent 
and responsibility are attributed to the victim, the results 
of Study IV suggest attraction to the victim will be 
adversely affected. On the ether hand, if manipulative 
intent is not attributed to the victim attraction will be 
high. Study V suggests that if the winner/loser character of 
th0 Si tuat ion Xca.âS tO cLttr*  i tut  lOH Of thZëâtS tC ths 
observer's security, attraction will be lowered. The results 
of that study also suggest that if responsibility is 
attributed to the victim, the observer will not be helpful, 
but if the observer feels responsible for the victim's 
plight, then he/she will be helpful. 
Admittedly, the above outline does not constitute a 
theory of justice and deserving. However, it does include 
constructs such as interdependence, beneficence, attribution 
of responsibility, and interpersonal attraction which can be 
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manipulated or observed in the laboratory. Unfortunately 
much of the discussion hinges upon attributions which leaves 
the approach taken here open to the same criticisms as 
Lerner's just world hypotheses. This openendedness occurs 
because of the possibility of contradictory attributions 
being made in similar social contexts. Similar confusion 
occurs under control conditions where there are no powerful 
indicators in the social context. Recall that under control 
conditions there is no relationship of any kind between the 
observer and victim. Here there are no salient social 
context indicators to signal what attributions might be made. 
However, despite the lack of social context indicators an 
observer may become defensive and reject the victim because 
suffering arouses a negative emotional state in the observer. 
Perhaps this is the essence of lerner's just world 
hypothesis, that we have a need to blame the victim because 
he/she makes us feel uncomfortable rather than a need to 
believe in justice for all. The theoretical approach taken 
here considers attributions mediating events that affect the 
impact of social context variables on the attraction 
response. As such, attribution processes can be studied, 
even though unobservable, because they are theoretically 
related to the social context indicators and attraction 
measures. That is, attributions are anchored in both the 
stimulus configuration (social context) and in the attraction 
8U 
response (character ratings-willingness to help). 
Clearly the efforts put forth in this investigation are 
merely a beginning in the process of systematically exploring 
observers* reactions to suffering in others. Hopefully the 
empirical crucible will yield an adequate theory of justice 
in the near future. 
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APPLICATIONS TO REAL WORLD SETTINGS 
Although an adequate theory of justice is not available, 
the results of these five studies suggest that attributions 
of manipulative intent and/or personal responsibility when 
fates are interdependent lead us to perceive a victim as 
undesirable. Thus we blame the victims of poverty, etc., and 
label them as undesirable because we tend to view victims as 
origins of their own fates and to hold them responsible for 
their own plight. As Daniel Moynihan (1967, p. 33) has 
stated in his discussion of the black urban poor: 
"...compassion for the suffering Christlike nonviolent Negro 
demonstrators of the South was a different thing from loving 
and understanding the frequently debased and disorderly 
slumdwellers of the North...." The fact that distortions of 
the victim's character were found to vary with intensity of 
Suffering, compensation for suffering, perceived personality 
similarity, social desirability of the victim's pre-suffering 
behavior, interdependence of the observer's and victim's 
fates, and hedonic relevance of the victim's suffering for 
the observer in the present investigation indicates that 
observers react to the social context indicators describe 
above rather than normative beliefs about justice in deciding 
what kind of person the victim is. 
The preceding quote also suggests the present 
theoretical analysis to have implications for real-world, as 
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well as laboratory settings. For example, the results of 
Studies I and II concerning the joint effects of compensation 
and victim intentionality suggest that if the poor are 
considered undesirable, it is probably because they receive 
welfare payments. Fortunate individuals can "rest on their 
laurels" while the poverty of less fortunate people provides 
the excuse for derogation and exploitation. The unemployed 
are "welfare chiselers" but farmers with a huge land bank are 
not suspect. This argument is consistent with some current 
sociological opinions about why the victims of poverty are 
labeled as bad and unlikable by the general population (Ryan, 
1971) . 
a second real-world setting to which the present results 
can be applied is the dispensation of justice by our legal 
system. Ideally the perceived attractiveness of the 
defendant should not influence jury decisions,- but as 
Clarence narrow is reputed tc have remarked in a speech given 
in 1933, "Jurymen seldom convict a person they like, or 
acquit one they dislike." In the courtroom a victim of rape 
may easily become the defendant if personal responsibility is 
attributed to the female by judge, jury, and even the defense 
counsel. As pointed out earlier, observers tend to attribute 
personal responsibility to others for their fates, even when 
there is no apparent link between the actor's behavior and 
outcomes (Jones 6 Nisbett, 1971; shaw, 1972). Jones and 
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aronson (1973) have provided data which suggest that victims 
of rape may be viewed as responsible for their misfortune, 
with the rapist given a corresponding light sentence, even if 
convicted. The results of Study IV concerning the adverse 
effects of suspected attempts at impression management on 
perceptions of the victim suggest that the prosecution in a 
rape case may have an advantage if the defense attempts to 
manipulate the jury's impression of the rape victim rather 
than sticking to the facts of the case. According to the 
results of Studies III and IV, establishing the victim's lack 
of culpability and the appropriateness of her pre-assault 
behavior would seem to be a fruitful strategy for the defense 
in a rape case. If that can be done, the chances of 
attribution of personal responsibility for the rape to the 
female would be minimized. 
k third and final real-world setting the present 
analysis applies to is helping behavior. Previous research 
in this area reported in connection with study V indicated 
that if the dependent other can be blamed for his/her own 
plight, then lowered perceived attractiveness and/or reduced 
helping results (Bryan 5 Davenport, 1968). The results of 
Study V tended to support these earlier findings, but suggest 
that feelings of guilt and sorrow increase our willingness to 
provide aid to dependent victims, but do not affect our views 
of a dependent victim's goodness and likability. 
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Culpability, or the attribution of personal responsibility, 
seems to be a necessary and sufficient condition for a victim 
to be viewed as bad and unlikable, and may be a sufficient 
condition for decreased helping of a victim if it eliminates 
feelings of guilt and sorrow. 
In sum, an innocent victim who can not be held 
responsible for his/her plight will be viewed positively and 
will be helped by an observer who feels guilty about allowing 
suffering to continue unabated. 
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APPENDIX R 
Dependent Measures for study I 
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Person Perception Rating Form 
Please answer each statement about the other subject by 
placing a number from "1" to "99" in the space following the 
statement. Answer 1 to those statements you completely 
DISAGREE with, and answer 99 to those statements you 
completely AGREE with. Answer with numbers between 1 and 99 
for statements which you agree or disagree with less than 
completely. Please do not leave any blanks. The following 
scale may help in keeping these directions in mind. 
DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
Compared to the average student, the other subject is... 
1. good 2. disreputable 3. likable 
U. beautiful--— 5. brave 
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APPENDIX B 
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Victim 
Perceived Attractiveness Scores from Study I 
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Source af MS F 
Intentionality (I) 1 262.04 1.58 
Compensation (C) 1 77.66 <1 
Intensity of Suffering (IS) 1 1060.32 4.69* 
I X C  1 2053.22 9.08** 
I X IS 1 238.32 1.05 
C X IS 1 .32 <1 
I X C X IS 1 475.79 2.10 
Error 56 226.32 
Corrected Total 63 267.33 
*2 < .05 
»*£ < .01 
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APPENDIX C 
Second Measure of Attraction For Study 
99 
The Interpersonal Judgement Scale 
Please check the position which comes closest to your 
attitude about the other subject. 
PERSONAL FEELINGS 
I feel that I would probably... 
like this person very much. 
like this person. 
like this person to a slight degree. 
neither particularly like nor dislike this person. 
dislike this person to a slight degree. 
dislike this person. 
dislike this person very much. 
HOPKING TOGETHER IN AH EXPERIMENT 
I believe that I would... 
very much enjoy working with this person in an 
experiment, 
enjoy working with this person in an experiment. 
enjoy working with this person in an experiment to a 
slight degree. 
—--neither particularly enjoy nor dislike working with this 
person in an experiment. 
dislike working with this person in an experiment to a 
slight degree. 
dislike working with this person in an experiment, 




Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Victim 
Perceived Attractiveness Scores from Study II 
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Intentionality by Compensation analysis 
Goodness and Likability Byrne's US 
Source df MS F MS F 
Intentionality (I) 1 225.8 1.02 .63 1.00 
Compensation (C) 1 3.1 <1 1.76 2.78 
I X C  1 946.1 4.27* U. 88 7.72** 
Error 28 221.7 .63 
Corrected Total 31 238.2 .81 
Intentionality by Suffering analysis 
Intentionality (I) 1 258. 8 <1 1.13 2. 01 
Suffering (S) 1 16. 5 <1 .28 <1 
I X S 1 . 1 <1 . 13 <1 
2® 316.2 qA 
Corrected Total 31 294.5 .56 
*2 < .05 
»»£ < .01 
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APPENDIX E 
Example of a Bogus Personality Profile for Study III 
103 
Personality Description For . 
Trait Score 
1. general anxiety 85 
2. self-control 90 
3. physiological reactivity 50 
a, need for admiration 80 
5. fear of failure 20 
How would you rate the accuracy of the above description? 
not accurate at all very accurate 
1 10 20 30 UO 50 50 70 80 90 99 
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APPENDIX F 
Manipulation Check Questions for Study III 
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Pre-experimental Questionnaire 
Please answer the following statements by placing a 
number from "1" to "99" in the space following the statement. 
Answer 1 to those statements you completely DISAGEEE with, 
and answer 99 to those statements you completely AGREE with. 
Answer with numbers between 1 and 99 for statements which you 
agree or disagree with less than completely. Please do not 
leave any blanks. The following scale may help in keeping 
these directions in mind. 
DISAGREE ONCERTAIN AGREE 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
In general, my personality is similar to the other 
subject's. 
The other subject reacted enthusiastically to his role in the 
experiment in which he is to participate:-
How would you describe the other subject's emotional reaction 
to his role in the experiment in which he is to participate? 
angry terrified disapproving 
——happy -—-overjoyed -frightened 
— — sad -—-accepting -—--ecstatic 
I was very enthusiastic about the role in the experiment in 
which I am to participate. 
How would you describe the emotional reaction you had to your 
role in the experiment in which you are to participate? 
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——angry ——terrified -disapproving 
happy overjoyed frightened 
--—sad -—-accepting -—--ecstatic 
Briefly describe what your role is in the experiment in which 
you are participating. 
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APPENDIX G 
Summary of the Regression Analysis for Victim 
Perceived Attractiveness Scores from Study III 
as a Function of Perceived Personality Similarity 
of the Observer and victim and the Social Desirability 
of the victim's Pre-suffering Behavior 
108 
Source df MS F 
Control versus all others 1 210. 45 1. ,73 
Perceived Personality Similarity (PPS) 1 U32. 95 3, .58 
Social Desirability (SD) 1 267. 38 2, .20 
PPS X SD 1 679. 88 5. ,59* 
Error 35 121. 64 
Corrected Total 39 147. 35 
*£ < .05 
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APPENDIX H 
Dependent Measures for Study IV 
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Person Perception Bating Form 
Please answer each statement about the other subject by 
placing a number from "1" to "99" in the space following the 
statement. Answer 1 to those statements you completely 
DISAGREE with, and answer 99 to those statements you 
completely AGREE with. Answer with numbers between 1 and 99 
for statements which you agree or disagree with less than 
completely. Please do not leave any blanks. The following 
scale may help in keeping these directions in mind. 
DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
Compared to the average student, the learner is... 
1. good 2. disreputable 3. likable 
4. beautiful 5. brave 
During the experiment.- the learner was,-: 
1. trying to get me to like her. 
2. responsible for the shocks she received. 
3. free to leave at any time, and to refuse to take the 
shocks.—---
4. angry about her role in the experiment in which she 
participated. 
5. deserving of the shocks she received. 
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How many shocks did the learner receive during her task?-
Do you think the shocks were painful? 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary of the Regression Analysis for Victim 
Perceived Attractiveness Scores from 
Study IV as a Function of Intentionality and 
Interdependence of Fates 
113 
Source df MS F 
Intentionality (I) 1 657. 03 1. 21 
Interdependence of Fates (IF) 1 2983. 78 5, 20* 
I X IF 1 2228. 78 3. ,95* 
Initial Attraction 1 787. 86 1. 40 
Error 27 565. 69 
Corrected Total 31 708. 3 
»£ < .05 
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APPENDIX J 
The Revised Belief in a Just World Scale 
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Please indicate your degree of agreement with the 
following statements by placing a number from "I" to "99" in 
the space following the statement. Answer 1 to those 
statements you completely DISAGREE with, and answer 99 to 
those statements you completely AGREE with. Answer with 
numbers between 1 and 99 for statements which you agree or 
disagree with less than completely. Please do not leave any 
blanks. The following scale may help in keeping these 
directions in mind. 
DISAGREE ONCEBTAIN AGREE 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
1. Basically, the world is a just place. 
2. The political candidate who sticks up for his principles 
rarely gets elected. 
3. I've found that a person rarely deserves the reputation 
he has.—--
U, It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off 
free in American courts, 
5. Students almost always deserve the grades they receive in 
school.----
6. Crime doesn't pay.--— 
7. When parents punish their children, it is almost always 
for good reasons. 
8. It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair 
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trial in the OSA. 
9. In almost any business or profession, people who do their 
job well rise to the top. 
10. In almost all professional sports, many fouls and 
infractions never get called by the referee. 
11. Although evil men may hold political power for a while, 
in the general course of history good wins out. 
12. By and large, people deserve what they get. 
13. American parents tend to overlook the things most to be 
admired in their children. 
1U. It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to 
jail.—--
15. People who get * lucky breaks' have usually earned their 
good fortune. 
16. Hen who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a 
heart attack. 
17. People who meet with misfortune often have brought it on 
themselves. 
18. Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded. 
19. Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic 
accidents as careless ones, 








Please indicate your feelings about the Viet Namese 
Refugees who have come to America by placing a number from 
"1" to "99" in the space following the statement. Answer 1 
to those statements you completely DISAGREE with, and answer 
99 to those statements you completely AGREE with. Answer 
with numbers between 1 and 99 for statements which you agree 
or disagree with less than completely. Please do not leave 
any blanks. The following scale may help in keeping these 
directions in mind. 
DISAGREE UNCERTAIN 
1 10 20 30 40 50 
1. Compared to the average American, the average Viet Namese 
Refugee is... 
y00d==-= disreputable-—- likable--- beautiful----
brave-—-
2. I feel guilty about America's role in creating the 
suffering of the Viet Namese Refugees. 
3. I feel sorry for the Viet Namese Refugees.-—-
4. The Viet Namese Refugees deserve their suffering. 
5. The Viet Namese Refugees are responsible for their 
suffering, 
AGREE 
60 70 80 90 99 
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6. The Viet Hamese Refugees could have avoided their 
suffering. 
7. America should give as much humanitarian aid as possible 
to the Viet Namese Refugees. 
8. If called upon, I would give as much help as possible to 
a Viet Namese Refugee. 
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APPENDIX L 
Summary of the Regression Analysis for Victim 
perceived Attractiveness Scores from 
Study V 
121 
Source df MS F 
Hedoiiic Relevance 2 1509.26 5.60** 
Belief in Justice 1 1259.72 4.67* 
Error 25 269.75 
Corrected Total 29 389.30 
»£ < .05 
**2 < .01 
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15/IJS Personal Feelings/1=dislike, 7=like 























































1/Perceived Similarity/1=similar, 2=dissimilar/3=control 
2/Social Desirability of Victim's Pre-suffering 
Behavior/1=undesirable, 2=d€£irable, 3=control 
3/Identification/no code 
U-5/Accuracy of Personality Profile/1=inaccurate, 99=accurate 
6-7/ldentification/no code 
8-9/Bating of Similarity/I=similar, 99=dissimilar 
10-11/Confederate*s Enthusiasm/1=enthusiastic, 99=reluctant 









11980 30407030 304030304040 1 1 0 
1188050507040102020804050 1 1 0 
1175070605050503040405050 1 1 0 
1163570609010606070208050 1 1 0 
1157070808020204030307060 1 1 0 
1148050409050402030107040 1 1 0 
1136545407525454525354561 1 1 0 
1113035456 515252515654535 1 1 0 
1287040508020654035159031 1-1 0 
12780 25155530503535156550 1-1 0 
1268035254065455025753535 1-1 0 
1257020306020303050104050 1-1 0 
1248030255060301030204030 1-1 0 
1236555456545352545553545 1-1 0 
1227545754545502030505040 1-1 0 
1216530758030406050406030 1-1 0 
2117535458535353535254545 
-1 1 0 
2123580609910305040306050 
-1 1 0 
2139565558545356555808545 
-1 1 0 
2148040458525202030108039 
-1 1 0 
2167520509940503020803551 
-1 1 0 
2177540409030403010506040 
-1 1 0 
2187065757525354535255535 
-1 1 0 
2197050753225353522834352 









33 3536 -10 0 -10 0 
33 1505 -10 0 -10 0 
33 4070 -10 0 -10 0 
33 4030 -10 0 -10 0 
33 2020 —1 0 0 —1 0 0 
33 1523 -10 0 -10 0 
33 2525 -10 0 -10 0 
33 1919 -10 0 -10 0 
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8-9/Lilcability/1 =unlikable, 99=likable 
10-11/Beauty/1=ugly, 99=beautiful 
12-13/Bravery/1=cowardly, 99=trave 
14-15/Manipulative Intent/1=no, 99=yes 



































22250806 099706050506001110714540 25 
























24-25/American Aid/1=no, 99=yes 
26®°27/'wOîî nxd/1—no» 99—yss 
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